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Abstract
Recent events have drawn into question the 'seams' in responsibility that exist between the nations military Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) for defense of the contiguous States.
Currently military Homeland Defense responsibilities for regional boundaries on land, sea, air, and for infrastructure are divided specifically between four CINCs and NORAD. Legal implications, interagency and State/local coordination and a unique supporting role are all new realities in the militaries role of Homeland Security. A renewed look at the precepts of the military's organizational relationships and the existing adaptability inherently designed in existing organizational structures will show that sound UCP options exist for adapting to new missions while not requiring radical UCP changes or appointing a new CINC specifically for regional geographic responsibility of the lower 48 states.
Homeland Security and the Unified Command Plan
Recent events have drawn into question 'seams' of responsibility that exists between the nation's military Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) for defense of the contiguous States. 1 Many 2345 have speculated that a CINC will be given the military warfighting leadership responsibility for the United States as the current Unified Command Plan (UCP) 6 does not assign a CINC regional responsibility for the lower 48 States. While events may accelerate the decision to create a CINC with sole geographic responsibility for the United States, strategic objectives for homeland defense must first be reflected in a coherent and comprehensive national military strategy relative to the ability of military power to achieve those objectives that support the national strategy. A balanced and comprehensive review of all threats to the nation's vital interests must be reflected in the particular mission that is not assigned to a specific region but global in nature, while regional commanders are assigned primarily for supporting national military strategy through accomplishing and controlling overall military actions within a specified region. The UCP command hierarchy ( 
Unified Command Plan Issues
The Unified Command Plan has evolved incrementally since it's inception as threats, national interests, strategies and capabilities have changed. Opinions vary on the required essential criteria for designating a unified command and on how the UCP should be structured; "one might also make the case that a unified combatant command should be for warfighters, or those directly executing rather than supporting military forces in conflicts and contingencies." 11 Many far-reaching proposals have been fielded regarding the reorganization of the Unified Commands ranging from a UCP reduction that assigns only three 'super CINCs' 12 to an incremental realignment of functions and boundaries among the existing unified commands. Central to the issue of the UCP structure is whether the plan should be based on regional, functional, or objective based command assignments. If the UCP structure is hybrid and contains more than one conceptual orientation it is difficult to limit the number of commands and meet all regional and major functional needs while also effectively delineating responsibilities that cross both functional and regional boundaries.
Public law required specific issues be addressed in the last UCP assessment:
The Loren's assessment does not dismiss the concept of regional assignments in the UCP however it does question the current boundaries and their effectiveness with regard to regional issues, cultural and physical boundaries and other agency regional boundary divisions. Issues of global geographic assignment are beyond this scope of discussion however the regional boundaries and missions adjoining and within the contiguous states are specifically pertinent, especially when attempting to develop a Unified Command Plan that is now focused on also accomplishing the task of Homeland Security.
A regional UCP orientation is designed to allow a commander to evaluate regional issues, tensions and possible conflicts and plan accordingly. Regional assignments also allow for the unified commander to coordinate all aspects of U.S. military force within the AOR and develop military and political relationships with countries in the region as well as other U.S. governmental agencies and representatives. Regional commanders are expected to gain expertise and the 'big picture' of their AOR, effectively coordinating with all aspects of national power when each is most effective. Functional commands are designated for missions that are vital to military strategy and are based on objectives that do not structurally fall within a specific region. A functionally based UCP could be difficult when conflict arises because multiple functions must be executed collectively and in coordination to accomplish the mission, the question is identifying which function is in command and which functions are subordinate. A purely functional orientation contradicts the concept of unity of command, as functions by their definition are unique and separate by nature. Under paragraph 2(C) above Congress charged CJCS to assess the possibility of assessing the feasibility of a purely functional UCP orientation with an example that is a hybrid of both objective and functional based orientations. It is extremely difficult to divide the militaries forces specifically along functional lines for the purpose of command and then execute collectively under a UCP that is based on unity of effort across functional capabilities, the concept smacks of a return to service parochialism. Functionally structured command orientations also beg the question of "who's in charge here?" when a conflict arises somewhere in the world and US interests are affected. Advocates of 'warfighting only CINCs' contend that functional commands should be subordinated to regional CINCs as supporting elements. While regional 'warfighting' only CINCs may appear logical or intuitive such a structure detracts from the concentration of effort realized by a unified command providing vital military functions. I would argue that the Strategic Command is a global vice regional warfighting CINC, executing a mission that is enormously vital to national security interests and as such warrants the oversight and unity of effort that a unified commander provides from force training, weapon systems development, mission execution, leadership interaction and coordination, and most important of all to plan for war.
Subordinating the nations nuclear strategic forces and mission to a unified commander that has a region of the world to concentrate on would detract from the strategic forces overall efficiency and effectiveness, especially since nuclear forces are intended for the defense of the United States from a nuclear attack. Looking forward the same argument could probably be said for SPACECOM, especially when including computer infrastructure information defense and warfare. STRATCOM and SPACECOM are distinctive in that their responsibilities, when executed, are not based on the support of external forces and as such allows for effective unity of command within the organization making them uniquely suited as unified commands. However, the argument could be made that their roles and missions are similar enough to integrate them into one unified command vice the current two.
Assessing homeland security from a comprehensive view with respect to current and future missions, STRATCOM and SPACECOM (NORAD included) will inevitably become more important in accomplishing the overall objective to defend America from all enemies through all possible mediums. An objective based structure (first theater command, second theater command, logistics command, special contingencies command, strategic command) would limit the regional expertise and coordinated theater specific planning that regional commander's accomplish.
While there are many good arguments intuitively and intellectually for changing the UCP based upon a universal construct of criteria based upon objectives which are oriented functionally or regionally, I would argue that there are too many benefits from keeping a hybrid UCP orientation based on regions and major vital functions or objectives versus a purely regional or functional structure.
Beyond the regional boundaries and structural issue, current UCP concerns appear to lie in the expanding roles of JFCOM as highlighted in a report for the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century:
The emerging role of United States Joint Forces Command as the Joint Force Trainer, Integrator, and Provider is seen by many as a challenge to traditional Service Title 10 roles. There appears to be a growing parochialism among the Unified Commands and the potential for future bureaucratic conflict among the CINCs is likely for several reasons: JFCOM's expanding role in Joint Experimentation and Joint requirements has caused some concern in the other unified commands as well as in the Services. There remains an undercurrent among the Unified Command staffs that JFCOM's responsibilities, especially as the integrator, invade the command prerogatives of the functional and geographic CINCs, who believe it is their responsibility to conduct training within their own commands.
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Government Agencies and Homeland Security
"It is a sad, but very real fact, that no amount of organizational surgery could have forced agencies to focus on the terrorist threats as much as the actions of nineteen individuals did on of interagency coordination and the role that the military will perform in homeland security, organizational structures cannot be developed without evaluating the overall system that they will be incorporated into. Of utmost importance is the military commander's ability to organize the command to effectively operate in the interagency environment. Unlike traditional regional CINCs the military command responsible for homeland security will have to coordinate with no less than 70 organizations as depicted in figure 3 .
By executive order the President directed the newly established Homeland Security Council and Office of Homeland Security to "ensure the adequacy of the national strategy for detecting, preparing for, preventing, protecting against, responding to, and recovering from terrorist threats or attacks within the United States". 18 The Office of Homeland Security is also directed to ensure preparedness for terrorist threats or attacks within the United States.
Preparedness is to be facilitated by the Office of Homeland Security through training and domestic exercises and simulations coordinated with all levels of local, state, and national entities. The Office of Homeland Security is also charged with terrorist prevention through coordinating security improvements to United States borders, territorial waters and airspace. 
Future of the Unified Command Plan and Homeland Security
Since terrorism is not confined to a state, nation or culture it is impossible, by historical principals, to defeat. Due to the character of terrorism and its asymmetric nature a perfect defense is also impossible. Identifying and defining the capabilities and threats posed by terrorism is extremely difficult in traditional military terms, which relates directly to the difficulty in developing an effective operational plan to counter its threats, capabilities, and the possible consequences. The most probable national strategic objective for terrorism could be stated as; do not allow terrorism to pose a credible threat to national interests. This objective can only be realized through the management or attempted control of terrorism and its consequences and will only be achievable through active and efficient coordination between the military, government agencies, state and local authorities and international cooperation.
Aspects and restraints of the homeland security mission include its scope, legality and the role that the military will fulfill. In the foreseeable future all domestic homeland security operations assessed against the possible range of military operations (Fig 4) One of the most pressing issues for homeland security is "Clarifying the roles and missions While the breadth of JFCOM responsibilities would still be large, the homeland security role could be managed through a subordinate unified CINC with a standing Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) coordinating interagency efforts. These actions would allow the America Command to initiate an organization that would have tasks and responsibilities which would parallel other agencies and facilitate interoperability. This recommended UCP change facilitates execution of the military's mission in homeland security while designating a unified commander for unity of command and effort.
CONCLUSION
Concerns and fears have become reality and the axiom 'not if -but when' is no longer speculative. Over the past decade Americans have suspected and had increasingly shown concern for the safety and security of our citizenry against acts of terrorists. On September 11 th suspicions became real and were seared into the American public conscious. These emotional circumstances have forced a renewed call for tangible actions against terrorism and in the defense of America and her citizens. Inevitably the military is looked upon to respond to this renewed call for protection and the expectation is for a rationale, articulate and coordinated response. While the military is charged broadly "to deter and defeat threats of organized violence to our country" 26 it's infrastructure and organization has evolved primarily around a symmetrical threat, which terrorists are not.
While speculation is strong that events will provide the catalyst to assign geographic responsibility for contiguous states to a CINC, I would argue that restructuring current missions and Areas Of Responsibility among the current unified commands will allow the military to accomplish the regional, functional and strategic objectives of homeland security.
Moreover, I would argue that the cost relative to the questionable effectiveness and benefits of directing to much of the military's resources to the defense of terrorist actions could deter attention from threats that could seriously endanger our most vital national interest, our way of life.
"We must always be mindful that the primary mission of our Armed Forces is to deter and, if necessary, to fight and win conflicts in which our vital interests are threatened." 
